AI planning algorithms have addressed the problem of generating sequences of oper ators that achieve some input goal, usu ally assuming that the planning agent has perfect control over and information about the world. Relaxing these assumptions re quires an extension to the action represen tation that allows reasoning both about the changes an action makes and the information it provides. This paper presents an action representation that extends the determinis tic STRIPS model, allowing actions to have both causal and informational effects, both of which can be context dependent and noisy. We also demonstrate how a standard least commitment planning algorithm can be ex tended to include informational actions and contingent execution.
Introduction
The ability to reason with incomplete information, to gather needed information, and to exploit that infor mation in a plan is essential to building agents that can perform competently in realistic domains. Research in AI planning has yielded al gorithms for plan genera tion, but mainly under assumptions that the agent has perfect information about and control over the world.
The decision sciences have developed techniques for representing sources of uncertainty: incomplete infor mation can be viewed as a probability distribution over world states, and conditional probabilities can repre sent the changes effected by executing an action as well as information gathered during action execution. This formalism provides us with methods for evaluat ing plans, but does not help us to generate them . This paper integrates the two lines of work: we present a representation for actions, plans, and information based on a standard probabilistic interpretat. ion of uncertainty, but one that can also can be manipu lated by a subgoaling plan-generation algorithm. The framework allows the representation of information producing actions (also known as "tests" or "diag nostics"). A standard least-commitment AI planning algorithm is extended to use this probabilistic repre sentation , and further to support contingency plans plans in which the execution of steps can depend on information provided by previous diagnostic actions. In this paper we will concentrate on the representation for actions and plans, referring the reader to (Draper et a/., I 994] for a more detailed description oft he plan ning algorithm.
1.1

Example
We begin by posing a simple example that demon strates the need for reasoning about information, plan ning to gather information, and acting based on that information.
A robot is given the task of processing a widget. Its goal is to have the widget painted (PA) and processed (PR) and finally notifying its supervisor that it is done (NO). Processing the widget consists of identifying it as either flawed (FL) or not flawed (IT), then re jecting or shipping the widget (reject or ship), respec tively. The robot also has an operator paint that usu ally makes PA true.
Although the robot cannot immediately tell whether or not the widget is flawed, it does have an operator inspect that tells it whether the widget is blemished (BL). The sensor usually reports bad if the widget is blemished, and ok if not. Initially any widget that is flawed is also blemished . But two things complicate the sensing process:
• Painting the widget removes a blemish but not a flaw, so executing inspect after the widget has been painted conveys no information about whether or not it is flawed.
• The sensor is sometimes wrong: if the widget is blemished then 90% of the time the sensor will re port bad, but 10% of the time it will erroneously report ok. If the widget is not blemished, how We will use s to refer to a random variable over states, and Sf the particular distribution over initial states. This random variable is defi ned as follows for our ex
Expressions. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the paint action: if the widget has already been processed , paint has no effect; otherwise with probability 0.95 the widget will become painted and any blemishes removed and with proba bility 0.05 the action will not change the state of the world at alP
We describe an action formally as a set of conse quences C;. Each consequence C; is a tuple of the form (7;, Pi,£;, o;), where T; is a set of domain propositions 2We define states explicitly in terms of fully specified sets for the sake of formal exposition only-an implemen tation is not required to represent states this wa.y. In fact, our planning algorithm has no explicit representation of state, instead it reasons directly about the component propositions.
3The leaves of the tree indicate changes to a state (like STRIPS adds and deletes.) Figure 2 : The ship and reject actions known as the consequence's trigger, p; is a probability, £i is a set of effects associated with the consequence, and o; is an observation label which will be explained below. The idea is that exactly one of an action's con sequences is actually realized when the action is exe cuted, and the effects of that consequence determine how the action changes the world. The representation for the paint action pictured in Figure 1 The effects set is a set of literals which describe changes the action makes to the world. We define this formally by the function RES: if £ is an effect set and s is a state,
It is important to note that these effects describe the change an action makes to a state. 
C,eA:w=RES(£;, s)
Lw P[w Is, A) = 1 for all states s and all actions A which follows from the fact that ( 1) distinct. trigger expressions are mutually exclusive, so in any state ex actly one trigger expression will have proba.bili t. y 1 and the rest will have probability 0, and (2) all probabilities for each individual trigger expression must sum to 1. In other words, an action's consequences are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Figure 2 shows two more actions relevant to the ex ample: ship and reject. Ship successfully processes the widget if it is not flawed and not already processed.
Reject processes the widget successfully if it is flawed and it has not already been processed.
Action sequences. We will often reason about executing a sequence of actions-we will use {At, A 2 , ... , A,.) to mean executing At, then A2, and so on, and () indicates the execution of no actions. The probability distribution over states induced by executing a sequence of actions is defined as
Information-producing actions
The definition of actions-and the example actions presented so far-have been described in terms of the changes they make to the world when they are ex ecuted: paint usually makes PA true and makes BL false, for example. What about actions that are exe cuted for the information they provide? How does this action representation handle an operator that finds out whether the widget is painted (without actually paint ing it) or the inspect action that determines whether or not the widget is blemished {without either adding a blemish to or removing a blemish from it)?
We cannot use the action's effects to model informa tion gathering: doing so would confuse the difference between the changes the action makes and the infor mation it provides, obscuring the difference between a plan that makes P true and a plan that determines whether P is true [Etzioni et al., 1992 ]. Instead we model the information produced by an action as a sep arate report provided to the agent when the action is executed.
Figure 3: The inspect action provides information but ha� no material effects.
We divide each action's consequences into a set of dis cernible equivalence classes (or DECs), and assign one report, or observation label, to each DEC. When the action is executed, the agent will receive the observa tion label corresponding to the DEC containing the consequence that was actually realized at execution time. The inspect action ( Figure 3 ) has two DECs: the first consists of the action's a and (3 consequences, and generates the report ok; the second consists of the action's 'Y consequence, and generates the report bad.4
The agent gets information from an observation label by making inferences about the world state, reason ing about what consequences of the action could have 4Note that since all of its effect sets are empty, it will not change the world under any circumstances. generated that label. If executing inspect produces the label bad, for example, the agent knows that conse quence r occurred, and can be therefore be certain that BL was true when inspect was executed. If it gets the report ok, on the other hand, it knows that either a or f3 occurred, and so it cannot be certain about the state of BL The information generated by executing inspect is summarized by the following conditional probabilities: P[badiBL):::: : 0.9 P[badiBLJ = 0.0
which is a standard probabilistic representation of a noisy evidence source (see, e.g., [Pearl, 1988, Chapter 
2]).
The updated degree of belief in a proposition, con ditioned on receiving an observation, is computed a<:> a Bayesian update: suppose inspect is executed in the initial state (where PR is known to be false a.ncl P[BL] = 0.3), and the report ok is received:
We likewise can compute P[BL I bad]:
The i nspect action can also provide indirect evidence information about propositions other than BL. Since BL and FL are initially perfectly correlated in the ex ample, we have P[FL I BL] = 1 and therefore can con clude P[FL I bad] = 1 and P[FL I ok] = 0.041 as welL Executing paint destroys this correlation, however, so executing inspect after paint would not provide any ad ditional information about FL (but it still would about BL). Thus the information content of an action cannot be fully characterized by examining the action alone it depends on what probabilistic relationships hold in the plan at the time the action is executed.
Executing an action that has exactly one DEC pro vi des no additional information about the world: the agent knows that one of the consequences occurred, but does not know which one. (We omit the (single) observation label from the action's pictorial represen tation in such cases, e. g. paint, ship and reject.)
We call an action information producing if it has more than one DEC, and causal if at least one of its effect sets is non-empty. Information-producing actions cor respond to the notions of a test or diagnostic. Our example actions are either causal but not informa tion producing (e.g. paint) or information producing but not causal (inspect), but our representation allows causal and informational effects to be mixed. This functionality is crucial (and absent from many AI rep resentations of actions with informational effects) be cause a planner needs to be able to reason about both the benefits and the costs of gathering information about the world. In our representation the benefi t of sensing is ascertained from the information it produces (its DECs) and the cost of sensing depends on the ac tion's triggers (what must be done to make the sensor operational) and its causal effects (what side effects are generated when the sensing action is executed and how they affect the rest of the plan). causal and informational effects. Photo-blemish also detects blemishes, but does so by taking a flash pic ture. In order for it to take the picture it has to have a charged battery (BC). If the battery is charged the action provides perfect information about the state of BL, and as side effects it illuminates the room (IL) and discharges the battery (BC). This action can be used in a plan for a variety of purposes: if the planner can make sure that BC is true, executing the action pro vides perfect information about BL. The action also provides perfect information about BC and it could be used used to make IL true (or BC false) . The sensor could be costly if it is difficult to make BC true, or if making IL true has some adverse impact on the rest of the plan.
Noisy actions. "Random noise" in the sensing pro cess is handled differently from noise in the effecting process: an effector that fails occasionally (and ran domly) is modeled by defining different consequences for the failure and success results. The two conse quences have the same trigger, therefore the distinc tion between the two consequences is made on the ba sis of the relative probabilities alone. A noisy sensor is modeled by attaching the same observation label to two or more consequences: inspect is a noisy sensor of BL because it can generate the observation label ok both when BL is true and when it is false. An ac tion can be a noisy effector but a perfect sensor, e.g. a pickup action might fail occasionally and probabilis tically, but it could provide perfect information about whether or not it succeeded.
Independence assumptions. We assume that the conditional probabilities p; of action consequences are independent of one another, both in repeated execu-tion of the same action and execution of different ac tions. For example, if paint is executed twice (when PR is false) the probability that it will fail to make PA true (at least once) is 1 -.95 2 = .0975. Likewise, whether or not paint fails does not affect the conditional prob ability that inspect will fail to recognize a blemished part. Thus we assume that each consequence's condi tional probabilities are true with respect to the agent's world model, and we require that each action defini tion include all dependencies on modeled aspects of the world. For example, suppose that the paint ac tion is more likely to fail if the weather is humid. If humidity is not part of the agent's world model, the contribution of humidity to failure will be encoded in the conditional probability of the {3 consequence (see Figure 1) . But if humidity is part of the agent's world model, then the paint action must explicitly represent this dependency (the consequences would be expanded to include the proposition designating humidity in the trigger conditions).
2.3
Plan steps and contexts.
A sensory action like inspect becomes useful when the planner can make the execution of other actions con tingent on the observation label generated by that sen sory action. To represent execution contingency, we define a plan step. Where an action defines the ef fect of an action in abstract, a plan step is a com ponent of a particular plan. A plan step is a pair: (action, context). The action is a<s descri bed above, the context dictates the circumstances under which the step may be executed.5 A context is a conjunction of observation labels from previous steps in the plan; a step is executed only if its context matches the obser vations actually produced during execution.
For example, suppose the agent wishes to execut.e this sequence of plan steps:
{notify,{}) )
Suppose the agent executes the inspect step and re ceives the report bad. It next considers executing the second step in the sequence, but skips ship since that step's context does not match the report produced by execution of inspect. It does execute the third step, reject, since the step's context does match t.he report produced by inspect. The fourth step, notify, has an empty context so it is executed regardless of whether reject or ship was executed. In summary, the agent must keep track of the e xecutwn context (the obset·va tion labels produced by the steps executed in the plan 5 1n fact each step also needs a unique index, to allow multiple instances of the same action to appear in the plan, in particular allowing the observation labels of repeated actions to be distinguished. so far), and execute plan steps only when their context matches the execution context.
2.4
Planning problems and solutions
Here we define the probability that a sequence of steps satisfies some goal expression (}. The definition is an extension of Equation 5 that takes into account each step's context and its relation to previously executed steps in the sequence. The effect of executing a step given an execution context is either (i) the effect of executing the corresponding action (if the contexts match) otherwise, (ii) no change. Executing an action has two effects: it changes the world state according to its consequences, and also adds an observation label to the execution context. Let ( be the execution context; it is a conjunction of the observation labels that have occurred so far in the plan. The context of step S, context(S), matches C if C 1-context(S).
We first define the base case
A non-executable step changes neither the distribution over states nor the execution context:
Finally, if step 51 is executable in the current con text it changes both the probability distribution over states and the execution context, according to the con sequences C; = {T; , p;, £;, o;) of action(Sl):
A planning algorithm produces a solution to a planning problem, both of which we will define now.
A planning problem consists of: ( 1) a probability distri bution over initial states 51, (2) a goal expression (} a set (conjunction) of domain propositions describing the desired final state of the system, (3) a set of actions defining the agent's capabilities, and ( 4) a probability threshold r specifying a lower bound on the success probability for an acceptable plan.
The planning algorithm produces a sequence of steps (51 , ... , S,.) as defined above. Such a sequence is a solution to the problem if the probability of the goal expression after executing the steps is at least equal to the threshold. The probability of goal satisfaction is defined from Equations ( 1) and (6)- (8): (9) where T is the initial null (always true) execu tion context.
A successful plan is a sequence of steps (St, ... , S,..) that satisfi es the inequality P[glsi,{St, ... ,S,..)];::: T.
This concludes the formal definition of the problem; next we describe a least-commitment algorithm for solving it.
3
Plans and planning
Our planner takes a problem (initial probability dis tribution, goal expression, threshold, set of actions) as input and produces a solution sequence-a sequence of steps whose probability of achieving the goal exceeds the threshold. Here we describe its data structures 
PR� a � �
Initial and goal steps. The planner initially con verts the problem's initial and goal states into two steps, initial and goal. The initia l step codes the initial probability distribution, and the goal step has a single consequence with the goal state as its trigger. Figure 5 shows initial and goal actions for the example.
Plans. Threats to links. The process of adding steps and links to the plan can generate conflicts. The presence of a link S;,-.E.Sj in a plan actually represents two com mitments on the planner's part: (1) to makeS; realize its consequence t, which will make p true, and (2) to keep p true from S; 's execution until Si 's execution. Therefore a threat to the link 5;,-.E.Sj is any step that (1) possibly occurs between S; and Sj and (2) has some consequence whose effect set contains p.
Planning algorithm. The planning algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1. Begin with the null plan, containing only steps initial and goal, the ordering (initial< goal), and no causa.! links.
Iterate:
(a) Assess the current plan: compute the proba bility that the current plan achieves the goal. Report success if that probability is at least as great as the threshold.
(b) Otherwise non deterministically choose a re finement to the current plan (reporting fail ure if there are no possible refinements), ap ply the refinement to the current plan, and repeat.
Assessment. A plan defines a partial order over its steps, which in turn defines a set of legal execution sequences. One simple assessment algorithm iterates over all step sequences consis tent with the plan's or dering constraints, calculating for each totally ordered sequence the set of states that could possibly occur and their associated probabilities (using the definition in Section 2.4), summing the probabilities of all states in which the goal is true. If it finds a sequence with success probability > T, it returns that sequence, oth erwise it returns failure. This simple version of plan as sessment is often quite inefficient. [Kushmerick et al., 1993] compares the performance of four different as sessment algorithms, including the simple version de scribed here. One of the most interesting assessment algorithms uses the plan's causal links to estimate the success probability without actually enumerating any totally ordered sequences or reasoning explicitly about states.
Refinement
. A plan refinement adds structure to a pl an, trying to increase the probability that the plan will achieve its goal expression. The probability of goal achievement can be increased in one of two ways:
• if {p, Si) is a subgoal, then adding a new link fro m so me (possibly new) plan step that makes p true might increase the probability that p is true at si '
and therefore might increase the success probabil ity,
• if a causal link is currently part of the plan but so me other step in the plan threatens the link, then eliminating the threat might increase the probability of the link's consumer proposition , and therefore might increase the success proba bility.
C-BURIDAN inherits all of BURIDAN 's refinement meth ods (discussed in [Kushmerick et al., 1993 , Draper et al. , 1994 ). We demonstrate them using the exam ple, then describe a new method of threat elimina tion, branching, which introduces contingencies into the plan.
Example. Recall that the example problem co nsists of an initial probability distribution over (two) states and the goal expression {PR, PA, NO}, the actions {paint, reject , ship, inspect} , and a success threshold of r = 0.8. The initial subgoals are the goal propositions: { {PR, goal) , (PA , goal) , ( NO, goal) }.
The planner can build a non-contingent plan in eight refinement cycles starting fro m the initial plan (Fig  ure 5) . First, the paint step is added along with a link paint0 e8. goal, then paint0 's trigger PR is supported using a link initial" f..a paint. Next the planner sup ports (PR, goal) by adding a ship step , linking its n co nsequence to the go al, resulting in two new subgoals {FL, ship) and {PR, ship) , both of which can be linked to the initial step's a co nsequence. The th reat that. ship po ses to the link initialo m paint can then be resolved by ordering paint before ship. Finally, the planner adds a notify step and a link notify ti !ill. goal, and supports notify t� 's trigger PR with the link ship" PR notify.
This plan-the best plan a non-contingent planner co uld produce-will work just in case the widget is i n i tially not flawed and the paint step works, which trans lates into a success probability of (0.7)(0.95) = 0.665. The success probability can be increased somewhat by adding additional paint steps to raise the proba bility that PA will be true, but withou t introd ucing information-producing actions and co ntingent execu tion, no planner can do better than 0.7.
At this po int a reasonable refinement would be to pro vide additional support fo r the subgoal (PR, goal} by adding a reject step and linking it to the goal . However this strategy introduces a pair of threats-reject makes PR true, threatening the link fro m initial to ship, and likewise ship makes PR true, threatening a link from initial to reject-which cannot be solved by adding ad ditional ordering constraints. We need a way to indi cate that only one of ship or reject sh ould be executed.6
6 We have simplified this example so that both ship and
Branching. Branching adds co ntexts to two plan steps that ensure that the two steps will never both be executable, and therefore that a threat between them will never actually materialize. There are three parts to resolving a threat by branching: (1) choose an information-producing step from the plan (o r add a new one) and two disjoint subsets of its observation labels, (2) co nstrain the execution context of one of the threatening steps to occur only when a label from the first subset is generated and co nstrain the context of the other threatening step to occur only when a label fro m the second subset is generated, and (3) generate subgoals fo r all the triggers of the branching step.
In the example, the planner chooses the inf ormation producing step inspect (adding it to the plan) and re stricts the execution context of ship to be ok and the execution co ntext of reject to be bad. [Mansell, 1993] , [Goldman and Boddy, 1994] , and deterministic conditional planners [Peot. and Smith, 1992] , [Pryor and Collins, 1993] . The longer paper discusses this work in more detail.
Recent work in planni ng under uncertainty, e.g. [Koenig, 1992] and [Dean et al. , 1993] , ado pts a model based on fully observab le Markov processes , which amounts to assuming that the planner is au tomatically provided with perfect info rmation about the world state every time it executes an action. This assump tion is directly opposed to our approach t.o the prob lem, in which inform ation about the world is provided only when the agent acts to obtain it, and is poten tially incorr ect.
Our model of action and info rmation is equivalent in expressive power to a partially observable Markov de cision process (POMDP) [Monahan, 1982] . The prob lem we are solving is diffe rent fr om the one common ly addressed in that literature, however. The POMDP problem is generally posed as fi nding a policy that maximizes some value fu nction over some p respec ified ?orizon. The horizon is the number of times the policy 1s to be executed, and may be infinite.
A policy is roughly analogous to our defi nition of a plan: both tell the agent what to do next based on its prior information about the world and what observa t ions it has recei ved from executing prior actions. It is also straightforward to build a value function that r :
wards the agent just in case it satisfies a goal expres siOn .
Our planning problem admits no clear notion of a pre specified horizon, however: the agent executes the plan to completion, hoping to satisfy the goal. A horizon is a � n alogous to the number of steps in a pl an our algo n thm gener ates, but it is not part of the input problem specification. Further, we do not insist on a policy (plan) that maximizes the probability of goal satis faction, i nstead accepting any plan that is sufficiently likely to satisfy the goal. (Indeed in many cases a fi ni te-l engt h probability-maximizing plan does not ex � st: if an action fails probabilistically, one can always � ncrease t he probability of success by adding another mstan ce of that action to the plan.)
A restaten1ent of our planning problem in the language of PO MOP would be "find a policy (with any horizon)
that achieves an expected value of at least v" where v is some value threshold. We know of no algorithms in the POMDP literature that address this problem.
Future work.
Future work will be directed in two areas : extending the expressive power of the action representation, and exploring methods fo r effectively generating cont i ngent plans. The main limitation of the representation l ang u age is the absence of any no tion of plan cost. C-BURIDAN gauges plan success by the probability of satisfying the goal, but [Haddawy and Hanks, 1993] demonstrate the limitations of this model. In order to reason realistically about the cost and value of i nformation, the action representation must be able to handle metric resources (like time, fuel, and money).
As a practical matter, C-BURIDAN can solve only very small problems. The search problem in a probabilis tic planner is significantly worse than fo r a classical planner because the former has to consider the pos sibility of raising a subgoal's probability by linking to it multiple times. Deciding when to branch and what sensing actions to use also causes computational problems. Ongoing research addresses the problem of how to represent and exploit effective heuristic search control knowledge.
